On the surface, the numbers speak for themselves. In 1998, in the depth of the Asian crisis, the cu

"The debate on austerity was the theme of the day at this year's World Economic Forum in Davos. And for good reason. Europe enters into recession again, at a time when the recovery in the U.S. begins at last and accelerating. And this has undermined the argument for fiscal consolidation, promoted so much in Europe.
Still got a separate conclusion from Davos. I chaired a session on "The new environment in East Asia," in which he participated panel of senior representatives Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Japan. With the exception of the participant from Japan, all the others had first hand experience of the devastating Asian financial crisis had happened in the late 90s.
They could not resist the temptation to lure Asia to debate between Europe and the USA. Instead ask Asians speakers to make assumptions about the impact of austerity measures in debt-ridden developed West, asked them to evaluate their own experience during and after the crisis one world trade in the late 90's.
First, initially expressed his dislike them on skew adjustment programs one world trade required under the terms of the Conditional rescue plans in the International Monetary Fund (the South Koreans still refer scornfully to the "IMF crisis" in the late 90s).
Second-and this is precisely the hidden surprise-all agreed that, with the benefit of hindsight, one world trade that these painful adjustments worthwhile because their economies-shaken by crisis, forced to adopt structural one world trade reforms that paved the way behind the spectacular economic one world trade performance today.
On the surface, the numbers speak for themselves. In 1998, in the depth of the Asian crisis, the cumulative production of the five economies of ASEAN-Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam-'sunk' by 8.3%. Real GDP in South Korea-which has long been considered the "favorite" of the newly industrialized countries of Asia shrank by 5.7% that year. But then, stringent requirements under the IMF bailouts and adjustment programs-the "dose" austerity suffered by Asia boosted the economy.
Consequently, the current account-the "Achilles heel" of the so-called economic miracle of East Asia went from a deficit to a surplus. For the five economies ASEAN, current account deficits-which averaged 4% of GDP in the years 1996 to 1997 were converted to an average surplus of 6.8% of GDP in 1998-99. Such "transformation" happened in South Korea, where the 2.8% current account deficit in 1996-1997 to a surplus of 8.6% in 1998-1999.
Since then, the area never looked back. Within two years, most of the Asian economies hit by the crisis regained the high pre-crisis growth levels. And there was a temporary one world trade recovery. Starting in 1999, the five ASEAN economies began a ten-year one world trade upward trend in annual, average annual rates of GDP growth to 5% (5.5% for South Korea in the same period). In short, there were no permanent, negative effects from short term 'dose' of austerity measures and to the extent that austerity was essential for the post-crisis treatment, long-term benefits proved so impressive one world trade and lasting.
Three lessons for the rest of us come to mind. First, there are no gains without pain. Few of us in the developed world can 'fathom' overall contraction of production to the extent experienced by the Asian economies in the crisis of 1998, not to mention one's political will to enforce one world trade our economies.
The economic dislocation and humiliation proud country would indeed be catastrophic (as can testify the Greeks today). But, once restored excesses, the post-crisis recovery of Asia were equally dynamic and stable.
Second, rates played an important role as a "release one world trade valve" in the early days of the adjustment procedure Asian countries after the crisis. As the region one world trade moved from the tight exchange rate regime tied to free-floating one world trade currencies, Asian rates "plunged" to fall against the dollar to range from 28% in South Korea and nearly 37% in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, to 80% in Indonesia. one world trade
Finally, one world trade there is no substitute for restructuring. In Asia in the late 90s, the measures were aimed at the financial sector dominated by structural adjustment programs imposed by the IMF, but there were programs that focused one world trade on reforms in taxation and spending, corporate governance, privatization