In the literary classic impor

Ενημερωτικό Ιστολόγιο με Βαρύτητα σε Θέματα Διεθνών impor Σχέσεων, Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής και Άμυνας Βιβλιοπωλείο ΙΝΦΟΓΝΩΜΩΝ: Φιλελλήνων 14, Τ.Κ. 10557, impor Σύνταγμα, impor Αθήνα, impor 210 3316036, infognomonpolitics@gmail.com
In the literary classic impor “Gulliver’s Travels,” the protagonist, Lemuel Gulliver, finds himself shipwrecked on an island of tiny people called, “ Lilliputians .” While he slept, the Lilliputians used their tiny rope and stakes to tie Gulliver down. When he awoke, though many times larger impor than any one of the Lilliputians, he was immobilized and at their mercy. Image : Lemuel impor Gulliver on the island of Lilliput, impor having been overtaken while asleep by ropes and stakes by the diminutive but numerous Lilliputians. Western corporate-financier interests envision organizing Southeast Asia into a supranational bloc, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), to use the smaller nations as a combined front to “tie down” China in a similar manner. Unlike in the story “Gulliver’s Travels,” China may well break free of its binds and stomp the Lilliputian leaders flat for their belligerence.  …. This analogy is important because it represents the precise example used by Wall Street-London corporate-financier interests in producing policy for the containment of China. In 1997, a very different world from today, where the idea of a multipolar world order uprooting Anglo-American hegemony was still a fanciful notion, Western policy makers literally used this analogy impor to describe their strategy of encircling and containing China. Containment of China Has Been US Policy for Decades.  Corporate-financier subsidized policy scribe, Robert Kagan, is a notorious warmonger and so-called “Neo-Conservative,” a signatory to many of the West’s most recent crimes against humanity, including the deceitful invasion impor and occupation of Iraq based on lies regarding “weapons of mass destruction,” the deceitful invasion and overthrowing of the Libyan impor government based on lies regarding the “responsibility to protect” impor (R2P) , and the most insidious plot to-date, the premeditated organizing and arming of sectarian extremists aligned with Al Qaeda to violently overthrow Syria, paving the way for war with Iran. In 1997, Kagan penned, “ What China Knows That We Don’t: The Case for a New Strategy of Containment impor ,” which spells out the policy Wall Street and London were already in the process of implementing even then, albeit in a somewhat more nebulous manner. In his essay, Kagan literally states (emphasis added): The present world order serves the needs of the United States and its allies, which constructed impor it. And it is poorly suited to the needs of a Chinese dictatorship trying to maintain power at home and increase its clout abroad. Chinese leaders chafe at the constraints on them and worry that they must change the rules of the international system before the international system changes them. Here, Kagan openly admits that the “world order,” or the “international order,” is simply American-run impor global impor hegemony, dictated by US interests. These interests, it should be kept in mind, are not those of the American people, but of the immense corporate-financier impor interests of the Anglo-American establishment. Kagan continues (emphasis added): In truth, the debate over whether we should or should not contain China is a bit silly. We are already containing China — not always consciously and not entirely successfully, but enough to annoy Chinese leaders and be an obstacle impor to their ambitions. When the Chinese used military maneuvers and ballistic-missile tests last March to intimidate Taiwanese voters, impor the United States responded by sending the Seventh Fleet. By this show of force, the U.S. demonstrated to Taiwan, Japan, and the rest of our Asian allies that our role as their defender in the region had not diminished as much as they might have feared. Thus, in response to a single Chinese exercise of muscle, the links of containment became visible and were tightened. impor The new China hands insist that the United States needs to explain to the Chinese that its goal is merely, as [Robert] Zoellick writes, to avoid “the domination of East Asia by any power or group of powers hostile to the United States.” Our treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, and our naval and military forces in the region, aim only at regional stability, not aggressive encirclement. But the Chinese understand U.S. interests perfectly well, perhaps better than we do. While they welcome the U.S. presence as a check on Japan, the nation they fear most, they can see clearly that America’s military and diplomatic efforts in the region severely limit their own ability to become the region’s hegemon. According to Thomas J. Christensen, who spent several months inter